河南工业大学学报（社会科学版）

基于绿色农产品供应链韧性视角，综合考虑绿色技术研发失败风险和产出不确定性，通过构建银行直接融资和制造商担保融资两种模式下资金约束的农产品原材料供应商决策模型，探讨了研发失败风险和产出不确定性对供应链融资和运营决策的影响，并检验了绿色研发激励契约和批发价格契约对供应链的协调效果。结果发现:两种融资模式下，研发失败风险和产出不确定性对供应链各方收益均产生不利影响，但担保融资可消除失败风险对产品绿色度的影响，进而提升农产品供应链抵御风险的韧性;当研发失败风险较大时，担保融资对供应链收益和减排更优，反之则银行直接融资更优;绿色减排激励契约能降低供应链分散决策下的“双重边际效应”，但无法实现集中决策时供应链的最优收益，而批发价格契约则能有效实现供应链协调，进而提升供应链韧性。

Based on the perspective of green agricultural products supply chain resilience,this paper comprehensively considers the failure risk and output uncertainty of green technology R&D,constructs the decision-making model of agricultural products raw material suppliers with financial constraints under the two modes of direct bank financing and manufacturer guarantee financing,and discusses the impact of R&D failure risk and output uncertainty on supply chain financing and operation decisions. It also tests the coordination effect of green R&D incentive contract and wholesale price contract on supply chain. The results show that:( 1) Under the two financing modes,R&D failure risk and output uncertainty have a negative impact on the returns of all parties in the supply chain but guarantee financing can eliminate the impact of failure risk on product greenness.( 2) When the risk of R&D failure is high,guaranteed financing is better for supply chain revenue and emission reduction,otherwise,direct bank financing is better.( 3) Although the green emission reduction incentive contract can reduce the " double marginal effect" under the decentralized decision-making of the supply chain,it cannot achieve the optimal revenue of the supply chain under the centralized decision-making;Wholesale price contracts can effectively realize supply chain coordination,thus improving supply chain resilience.